Government
Although the pro-government media played an important role in keeping Fidesz in power by relentlessly attacking the opposition in constant campaign mode, the main reason for the governing party’s enduring popularity was the economic growth between 2013 and 2020 – highlights the analysis authored by Gábor Győri and András Bíró-Nagy. For this reason, 2025 will be a crucial year for the government, especially in terms of the hoped-for economic recovery.
Economic growth slowed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, leading to a cost-of-living crisis, with the rise of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party being a striking sign of the public’s waning patience. The researchers note that the government still has time to improve the situation, but it must lay the groundwork for economic recovery by the 2026 election.
It is likely to be Minister Márton Nagy who will come up with some kind of solution. It is also worth noting that a temporary boost to GDP growth could be achieved through massive state spending in late 2025 or early 2026. However, economic growth alone may not necessarily be enough for an easy Fidesz victory.
This is why we can expect the repeated use of tactics employed earlier, such as:
amplifying polarising and divisive topics,
deploying new methods of fear-mongering,
continuing anti-immigration and anti-LGBTQ campaigns,
and portraying Péter Magyar as a puppet of Brussels – something that has already begun.
In 2025, it is likely that further tinkering with the electoral law will occur, as Fidesz needs to ensure it does not introduce too many changes too close to the elections, as this would suggest desperation.
– the analysis reads.
After the sudden and targeted introduction of gerrymandering in 2024 – redrawing constituencies in Fidesz’s favour – the party is continuously working on further manipulation of the electoral system, which could include lowering the parliamentary entry threshold for smaller parties and creating individual constituencies for Hungarians living beyond the borders.
In small parliaments like Hungary’s, even a few seats can make a significant difference, so these changes could greatly influence the outcome of the next elections. This will be particularly important if polls continue to show a race between Fidesz and Tisza as tight as it was at the end of 2024.
MOHOS MÁRTON / 24.HU At a protest was organized by the Tisza Party at MTVA on October 5, 2024.
Opposition
“If 2023 was the low point for the opposition since 2010, then 2024 became its peak so far” – the forecast states, and according to Policy Solutions, this holds true even if certain opposition parties closed a really bad year. While there have been hopeful moments in the past, particularly during the 2019 municipal elections and the 2021 opposition primaries, no party had achieved the level of success that the Péter Magyar-led Tisza Party has reached.
As the analysis points out,
for the first time in twenty years, there is a party in Hungary that can challenge Fidesz without having to form uncomfortable alliances that damage its own brand. This represents a monumental change.
The institute also emphasises that the achievement of Tisza replacing other, waning opposition parties should not be underestimated. Since 1990, only Fidesz has managed to do such a thing, when after the 1994 MSZP victory it decided to absorb the remnants of the old right-wing. Moreover, while it took Viktor Orbán years to be seen as the leader of the right, Péter Magyar achieved the same status on the left in just four months – as a conservative who primarily appealed to left-wing and liberal voters, as well as the disillusioned supporters of Fidesz.
Over the past year, Magyar has already experienced some of Fidesz’s toughest tricks, with the pro-government media empire launching a relentless character assassination campaign against him. However, not only has he survived, but he has also managed to increase his support in the process.
In 2025, Magyar will lead the only significant opposition force, and although other parties may hope for his collapse, it is far more likely that he will continue to grow stronger and become a serious challenger to Fidesz in 2026. Magyar believes it is crucial to avoid making deals with the “old” opposition, as even bringing their diminished voter bases into the emerging Tisza movement in exchange for a few positions could have catastrophic consequences.
Some argue that Magyar, in the context of potentially coming to power, will not be able to avoid addressing some truly difficult questions. For example, will they adhere to the laws created by Fidesz that are designed to constrain a government led by the opposition, or will they break the law by modifying legislation requiring a qualified majority with a simple majority, citing anti-democratic law-making? Will they remove the Chief Prosecutor and similar key figures, even if they lack the legal means to do so? Will they seize the assets of those who enriched themselves by stealing public funds?
However, Péter Magyar does not necessarily need to take a clear stance on these issues. He spoke ambiguously about many topics in 2024, and similarly to the barrage of attacks unleashed by the government’s media empire, this has not harmed his reputation. Magyar could go through his campaign how Viktor Orbán – whom he considers a role model in many ways – did in 2010: the less he says, the less likely it is that he will alienate certain groups.
The most likely scenario for 2025 is that Péter Magyar will not fade into the traditional role of a politician and will do many things differently from what is expected of him. So far, he has benefitted from rejecting traditional principles about how politics works – the analysts state.
The analysis also highlights that there are numerous pitfalls awaiting Magyar until the next election. These include the possibility of being involved in a scandal he cannot shake off or, conversely, his person becoming uninteresting and irrelevant.
The upcoming year will be a long and perilous journey toward the first genuinely competitive election in two decades.
Foreign Policy
On the international stage, 2025 could be a good year for Fidesz, though there are risks as well – the researchers warn.
From January, a situation similar to 2019 will emerge, where Orbán’s political allies and personal friends are in power in both the United States and Russia, and relations with China remain amicable. Vladimir Putin has, of course, remained in power throughout, while Donald Trump has been re-elected and has become even more popular. Additionally, Hungary has managed to further improve its relations with China and its president Xi Jinping compared to the already favourable position it enjoyed before.
VARGA JENNIFER / 24.HU
Nevertheless, there appears to be some relief for Orbán. The globally observed decline in pro-Ukraine attitudes has led to a softening of the widespread anger directed at him. More importantly, Trump’s re-election has arrived at a critical moment for the Hungarian prime minister. The incoming American president could ease enormous diplomatic pressure on Orbán if he decides to use his considerable influence in Europe on Orbán’s behalf.
If Trump, however, chooses not to do so because Fidesz’s leader simply isn’t important enough to spend political capital on, Orbán would still find relief in the fact that pressure from the United States would lessen – especially after Antal Rogán’s ban from the country. Although Hungarian voters are less concerned with foreign policy, a visit to the White House with Trump, along with remarks supporting the Hungarian government’s policies, could provide a boost for Orbán’s momentum. Furthermore, Fidesz could use the altered situation to justify itself after years of hostility from the American administration.
In recent years, the Hungarian government has lost several key allies, including the Polish government led by PiS, the ousted Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, and the Slovenian prime minister Janez Janša. However, it has gained important new friends, such as Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Argentine President Javier Milei, and, of course, Donald Trump. These gains more than offset the losses. In the coming years, Orbán’s carefully nurtured friendship with Marine Le Pen, leader of the French far-right, could also pay off, especially considering the political crisis in France, which might even lead to snap elections.
– claims Policy Solutions.
While he will have no control over the strength of this network, he could theoretically use the influential populist figures within it to secure funding, enhance his standing in the eyes of Hungarian voters, and pressure the EU to allow him to operate without the threat of financial sanctions. Among these three objectives, achieving the third is the least likely. However, even if Orbán does not achieve a complete financial breakthrough, the favourable backwind from Trump’s re-election could enable him to further his goals. European foreign policy will likely have to adapt to the new realities of American foreign policy under Trump, which Orbán Viktor could exploit.
The analysis also considers potential negative scenarios for the Hungarian prime minister.
– this could especially be the case if tensions escalate between the US and China. And no one can expect Orbán to sacrifice the Chinese connections he has carefully developed over the course of several years. Meanwhile, the EU might draw the conclusion from the Trumpian shift in American foreign policy that it must work with leaders reliable enough to organise a joint foreign and security policy treating Russia as a strategic threat. Should such a scenario unfold, Orbán would continue to be seen as a threat within the political mainstream of Europe.
FISCHER ZOLTÁN / MTI / AFP A photograph taken and published by the Prime Minister’s Press Office on March 8, 2024, shows Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump.
Overall, despite the uncertainties facing Viktor Orbán and the Hungarian government on the international stage, this year already marks a significant improvement compared to the end of 2023, when increasing isolation and its immense financial costs were the main prospects for the coming year – the analysis concludes.
The post Weak economy, strong Tisza, uncertain foreign policy – Hungary’s forecast for 2025 first appeared on 24.hu.
